

DeBIN: Predicting Debug Information in Stripped Binaries

<https://debin.ai>



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Binaries with debug symbols

Assembly

```
80534BA:  
push %ebp  
push %edi  
push %esi ...
```

Debug symbols

```
80534BA  rfc1035_init  int  
8053DB1  fopen64      int  
8063320  num_entries  int  
      ⋮
```

Binary with debug symbols


Hex-rays

Descriptive names for functions and variables

```
int rfc1035_init() {  
    ...  
    if ( num_entries <= 0 ) {  
        v0 = ("/etc/resolv.conf", 'r');  
        if ( v0 || (v1 =  
            fopen64("resolv.conf"))){  
            // code to read and  
            // manipulate DNS settings  
        }  
        ...  
    }  
}
```

Decompiled code

Stripped binaries



Yes, with roughly 65% accuracy!

Challenges

Computes
 $1 + 2 + \dots + n$

```
<sum> start:  
  mov  4(%esp), %ecx  
  mov  $0, %eax  
  mov  $1, %edx  
  add  %edx, %eax  
  add  $1, %edx  
  cmp  %ecx, %edx  
  jne  8048400  
  repz ret  
<sum> end
```

Stores the value of
a semantic variable

Stores intermediate
(non-semantic) value

1. No mapping from registers and memory offsets to semantic variables

Challenges


```
<sum> start:
  mov 4(%esp), %ecx
  mov $0, %eax
  mov $1, %edx
  add %edx, %eax
  add $1, %edx
  cmp %ecx, %edx
  jne 8048400
  repz ret
<sum> end
```

Store the values of
the unsigned integer
variable n

Stores the result in an
integer variable res

1. No mapping from registers and memory offsets to semantic variables
2. No names and types

DeBIN: Recovering debug information



DeBIN recovers location information, types, and names

Predicting Debug Information in Stripped Binaries

DEBIN uses machine learning to recover debug information (e.g., names and types) of stripped binaries (x86, x64, ARM).

This is helpful for various binary analysis tasks such as decompilation, malware inspection and similarity.

DEMO

Select Binary File

Upload 

Linux ELF binaries on x86, x64 and ARM (without Thumb instructions), 2MB maximum.

or try samples:


lcrack.x86

chgpasswd.x64

ls.ARM


How does DeBIN work?

DeBIN: System overview




Step 1: Recovering variables

Learning how to recover variables




Variable recovery




Assembly

```
mov 4(%esp), %ecx  
mov $0, %eax  
mov $1, %edx  
add %edx, %eax  
add $1, %edx.2  
cmp %ecx, %edx  
jne 8048400  
repz ret
```



Step 2: Predicting names and types

Probabilistic graphical model



Probabilistic graphical model

Relationship	Template	Condition for adding an edge
<i>Function Relationships</i>		
Element used in Function	$(f, v, \text{func-loc}(v))$	variable v is accessed inside the scope of function f
	$(f, a, \text{arg-loc}(a))$	variable a is an argument of function f by calling conventions
	$(f, c, \text{func-str})$	string constant c is accessed inside the scope of function f
	$(f, s, \text{func-stack})$	stack location s is allocated for function f
Function Call	(f_1, f_2, call)	function f_2 is called by function f_1
<i>Variable Relationships</i>		
Instruction	$(v, \text{insn}, \text{insn-loc}(v))$	there is an instruction insn (e.g., add) that operates on variable v
Location	$(v, l, \text{locates-at})$	variable v locates at location l (e.g., memory offset $\text{mem}[\text{RSP}+16]$)
Locality	$(v_1, v_2, \text{local-loc}(v_1))$	variable v_1 and v_2 are locally allocated (e.g., EDX.2 and EDX.3)
Dependency	$(v_1, v_2, \text{dep-loc}(v_1)-\text{loc}(v_2))$	variable v_1 is dependent on variable v_2
Operation	$(v, \text{op}, \text{unary-loc}(v))$	unary operation op (e.g. unsigned and low cast) on variable v
	$(n_1, n_2, \text{op-loc}(n_1)-\text{loc}(n_2))$	binary operation op (e.g., +, left shift \ll and etc.) on node n_1 and n_2
	$(v_1, v_2, \text{phi-loc}(v_1))$	there is a ϕ expression in BAP-IR: $v_1 = \phi(\dots v_2, \dots)$
Conditional	$(v, \text{op}, \text{cond-unary})$	there is a conditional expression $\text{op}(v)$ (e.g., not (EAX.2))
	$(n_1, n_2, \text{cond-op-loc}(n_1)-\text{loc}(n_2))$	there is a conditional expression $n_1 \text{ op } n_2$ (e.g. EDX.3 != ECX.1)
Argument	$(f, a, \text{call-arg-loc}(a))$	there is a call $f(\dots, a, \dots)$ with argument a
<i>Type Relationships</i>		
Operation	$(t, \text{op}, \text{t-unary-loc}(t))$	unary operation op on type t
	$(t_1, t_2, \text{t-op-loc}(t_1)-\text{loc}(t_2))$	binary operation op on type t_1 and t_2
	$(t_1, t_2, \text{t-phi-loc}(t_1))$	there is a ϕ expression: $t_1 = \phi(\dots t_2, \dots)$
Conditional	$(t, \text{op}, \text{t-cond-unary})$	there is a unary conditional expression $\text{op}(t)$
	$(t_1, t_2, \text{t-cond-op-loc}(t_1)-\text{loc}(t_2))$	there is a binary conditional expression $t_1 \text{ op } t_2$
Argument	$(f, t, \text{t-call-arg-loc}(t))$	call $f(\dots, t, \dots)$ with an argument of type t
Name & Type	$(v, t, \text{type-loc}(v))$	variable v is of type t
	$(f, t, \text{func-type})$	function f is of type t

EDX.2

f_4 i
 f_5 i
 f_6 p

ght
 .8
 .6
 .3

Know
 Unkn
 Binar
 Factors

Probabilistic graphical model

	EDX.3	ECX.1	weight
f_1	i	n	0.5
f_2	p	s	0.3
f_3	a	b	0.1

	EDX.2	EDX.3	weight
f_4	i	i	0.8
f_5	i	j	0.6
f_6	p	p	0.3

dep-EDX

Next

How are the features and their weights learned?

EDX.3	weight
i	0.8
i	0.6
p	0.3

Known elements

1

1

Unknown elements

ECX.1, ...


Binary features

f_1, f_2, \dots

Factors



Learning how to predict names and types




Binaries with debug symbols

(f_{unary}, Op, Var)
 $(f_{var-dep}, Var_1, Var_2)$
 ...

Feature templates

23 templates



Dependency graphs

Actual graphs have >1K nodes

Static analysis

binary features		
f_1	i	n
f_2	p	s
f_3	a	b
f_4	i	i
f_5	i	j
f_6	p	p

3-factor			
1	i	i	
1	j	i	
1	p	p	

4-factor			
1	i	i	k
1	j	i	a
1	p	p	v

Binary features and factors

Train model

	name1	name2	weight
f_1	i	n	0.4
f_2	p	s	0.5
f_3	a	b	0.2
f_4	i	i	0.3
f_5	i	j	0.6
f_6	p	p	0.4

3-factor			weight
1	i	i	0.4
1	j	i	0.2
1	p	p	0.1

4-factor				weight
1	i	i	k	0.3
1	j	i	a	0.5
1	p	p	v	0.2

Find **weights** that maximize $P(\vec{U} = \vec{u} | \vec{K} = \vec{k}_i)$ for all training samples (\vec{u}_i, \vec{k}_i)

End-to-end recovery of debug information

Recovering debug information

```
<sum> start :  
  mov  4(%esp), %ecx  
  mov  $0, %eax  
  mov  $1, %edx  
  add  %edx, %eax  
  add  $1, %edx.2  
  cmp  %ecx.1, %edx.3  
  jne  8048400  
  repz ret  
<sum> end
```

Stripped binary

Registers / mem offsets

EDX.2 EDX.3

EDX.1 ECX.1

Known elements

0 1 mov

Semantic variables


EDX.2 EDX.3 ECX.1

Temporary

EDX.1


Known elements

0 1 mov



Recovering debug information

MAP inference



Recovering debug information

```

<sum> start :
  mov  4(%esp), %ecx
  mov  $0, %eax
  mov  $1, %edx
  add  %edx, %eax
  add  $1, %edx.2
  cmp  %ecx.1, %edx.3
  jne  8048400
  repz ret
<sum> end
    
```

Stripped binary

Registers / mem offsets

EDX.2 EDX.3

EDX.1 ECX.1

Known elements

0 1 mov

Semantic variables



EDX.2 EDX.3 ECX.1

Temporary

EDX.1

Known elements

0 1 mov



Loc	Name	Type
	sum	int
	n	uint
	i	uint
	res	int

Debug information

DeBIN implementation

DeBIN implementation

Static analysis: BAP

<https://github.com/BinaryAnalysisPlatform/bap/>

Learning and inference




<http://scikit-learn.org>



<http://nice2predict.org>



830 Linux packages
x86, x64, ARM




<https://debin.ai>

DeBIN evaluation

1. How accurate is DeBIN's variable recovery?
2. How accurate is DeBIN's name and type prediction?
3. Is DeBIN useful for malware inspection?

Variable recovery accuracy



Predicted as semantic registers and memory offsets


$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{|TP| + |TN|}{|sem| + |tmp|} = \frac{\text{Green Circle} + \text{Red Circle}}{\text{Green Box} + \text{Red Box}}$$


Results


Arch	Accuracy
x86	87.1%
x64	88.9%
ARM	90.6%


DeBIN recovers variables with nearly 90% accuracy

Name and type prediction accuracy



Total names and types (P) = 

Predicted names and types (PN) = 

Correct Predictions (CP) = 

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{|CP|}{|PN|} = \frac{|\text{green quarter}|}{|\text{circle}|}$$

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{|CP|}{|P|} = \frac{|\text{green quarter}|}{|\text{light green square}|}$$

$$F1 = \frac{2 * \text{Precision} * \text{Recall}}{\text{Precision} + \text{Recall}}$$

Evaluation of name and type prediction

Arch		Precision	Recall	F1
x86	Name	62.6	62.5	62.5
	Type	63.7	63.7	63.7
	Overall	63.1	63.1	63.1
x64	Name	63.5	63.1	63.3
	Type	74.1	73.4	73.8
	Overall	68.8	68.3	68.6
ARM	Name	61.6	61.3	61.5
	Type	66.8	68.0	67.4
	Overall	64.2	64.7	64.5

Consistent precision/recall of roughly 65%

Malware inspection



We inspected 35 x86 malware samples from VirusShare

Manipulating DNS settings

```
int sub_80534BA() {  
    ...  
    if ( dword_8063320 <= 0 ) {  
        v1 = ("/etc/resolv.conf", 'r');  
        if (v1 || (v1 =  
            sub_8053B1("resolv.conf"))){  
            ...  
            ...  
        }  
    }  
}
```

DE BIN

```
int rfc1035_init_resolv() {  
    ...  
    if ( num_entries <= 0 ) {  
        v0 = ("/etc/resolv.conf", 'r');  
        if (v0 || (v1 =  
            fopen64("resolv.conf"))){  
            // code to read and  
            // manipulate DNS settings  
        }  
    }  
}
```



Leakage of sensitive data

```
If (sub_806d9f0(args) >= 0) {  
    ...  
    sub_80522B0(args);  
    ...  
}
```


DE BIN

```
If (setsockopt(args) >= 0) {  
    ...  
    sendto(args);  
    ...  
}
```


Summary



Try online: <https://debin.ai>



Two-stage prediction process



High precision and accuracy